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We study the degree of precommitment that is required to eliminate multiplicity of
policy equilibria, which arise if the policy maker acts under pure discretion. We apply a
framework developed by Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) and Debertoli and Nunes
(2010) to a standard New Keynesian model with government debt. We demonstrate the
existence of expectation traps under limited commitment and identify the minimum
degree of commitment which is needed to escape from these traps. We ﬁnd that the
degree of precommitment which is sufﬁcient to generate uniqueness of the Pareto-
preferred equilibrium requires the policy maker to stay in ofﬁce for a period of two
to ﬁve years. This is consistent with monetary policy arrangements in many developed
countries.
& 2012 Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
In this paper we study the existence and uniqueness properties of monetary policy in a limited commitment framework
in the Blanchard and Kahn (1980) class of linear quadratic rational expectation models (LQ RE). This class of models is
typically used to study aggregate ﬂuctuations in macroeconomics. Building on research in Schaumburg and Tambalotti
(2007) and Debertoli and Nunes (2010) we show the existence of multiple equilibria under limited commitment policy.1
Similar to the case of pure discretion, under limited commitment policy makers cannot manage private sector expectations
which can lead to expectation traps and coordination failures. We investigate the question of how much precommitment
is needed to escape such expectation traps and to coordinate on the Pareto-preferred equilibrium. We ﬁnd that the
necessary degree of precommitment to eliminate multiplicity is relatively small – from two to ﬁve years – which is
consistent with tenure terms of monetary policy makers in many countries.
It is well known that in LQ models with rational expectations policies under commitment and discretion may imply
very different dynamics for the economy. With full commitment the policy maker has complete control over the private
sector’s expectations about future policy and steers them in a way that furthers his stabilization goals. The policy maker
can coordinate all future actions of consequent policy makers, which allows him to choose once, and apply indeﬁnitely, aner.ac.uk (C. Himmels), tatiana.kirsanova@glasgow.ac.uk (T. Kirsanova).
ds (1987). Lohmann (1992) studied limited commitment policies in a one-period setting.
BY license.
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is always unique (Kwakernaak and Sivan, 1972; Backus and Drifﬁll, 1986).
With no commitment at all, i.e. under pure discretion, the policy maker does not control the expectations of the private sector
and fails to coordinate the actions of consequent policy makers. Under discretion the policy maker optimizes in each period of
time and the private sector knows that future policy makers will implement the same decision process in subsequent periods (see
e.g. Oudiz and Sachs, 1985; Backus and Drifﬁll, 1986; Currie and Levine, 1993). However, under pure discretionary policy
expectation traps and multiple equilibria can arise because the expectations of the private sector are shaped by anticipations
about future policy actions. Since the policy maker cannot fully control private sector expectations, those expectations may trap
the policy maker into implementing a policy that validates them. The trap is closed if it is less costly for the policy maker to
validate the private sector beliefs about future policy than to ignore those expectations, see King and Wolman (2004).2
Under limited commitment a new policy maker arrives in ofﬁce with an exogenous probability a every period, reneges
on the past policy plan of its predecessor and credibly commits to a new policy plan that is optimal at this point in time.
Clearly, this framework has elements of both discretion and commitment. However, the policy maker can neither
completely control the expectations of the private sector, nor can he coordinate the actions of all future policy makers.
Therefore, coordination failures between the sequence of policy makers and the private sector can occur and may result in
multiple equilibria and expectation traps. Models with expectation traps can help us to explain the observed excess
volatility of macroeconomic data.3 These models should also be used to improve macroeconomic policy to avoid such traps.
Our contribution is twofold. First, we demonstrate, by example, that similar to discretion expectation traps also exist
under limited commitment.4 We use a simple New Keynesian (NK) model with government debt accumulation which
describes an economic behavior that is familiar from the literature on the ﬁscal theory of the price level (see e.g. Leeper,
1991). Second, we obtain the minimum degree of policy precommitment that is required to select the best equilibrium. We
demonstrate that a small degree of precommitment is enough to select the best equilibrium; a tenure of about 2–5 years is
sufﬁcient to eliminate all equilibria except the Pareto-preferred.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the NK model with debt accumulation. We ﬁrst review
properties of discretion and commitment policies for this model and demonstrate the existence of expectation traps under
quasi-commitment. Then we ﬁnd the minimum length of precommitment that is required to select the best equilibrium in our
model. Section 5 concludes. Finally, the appendix presents a numerical algorithm to ﬁnd policy with limited commitment.
2. The model with government debt
This section demonstrates the existence of multiple equilibria under limited commitment by example. We present a simple
NK model with government debt accumulation in the spirit of Leeper (1991). This model is well suited to use as an example to
demonstrate the existence of expectation traps and to study the dynamic properties of an economy under monetary policy with
limited commitment. First, unlike the model in Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) this model has an endogenous predetermined
state variable, government debt, which is affected by policy. The presence of such a variable is crucial to generate multiple
equilibria under discretionary policy in LQ REmodels (Blake and Kirsanova, forthcoming). A necessary condition for multiplicity is
the existence of strategic complementarities between the decisions of agents. An endogenous state variable ensures that the
current policy maker reacts (indirectly) to the past actions of the private sector and his predecessors. Therefore, the policy maker
can be trapped into implementing an undesired policy, if it is less costly to validate the expectations formed in the past, than
sticking to his initial policy plan. Second, the model is simple enough to derive most of our results analytically.5
We adopt the model from Benigno and Woodford (2003).6 The economy consists of a representative household, a
representative ﬁrm that produces the ﬁnal good, a continuum of intermediate goods producing ﬁrms and a monetary and ﬁscal
authority. The intermediate goods producing ﬁrms act under monopolistic competition and produce according to a production
function that depends only on labor. Goods are combined via a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) technology to produce aggregate output.
Firms set their prices subject to a Calvo (1983) price rigidity. Households choose consumption and leisure and can transfer income
through time through their holdings of government bonds. All agents can observe and affect the accumulation of real government
debt. The accumulation of government debt must depend on a ﬁscal stance. Hence, there is a non-optimizing ﬁscal authority
facing a stream of exogenous public consumption. These expenditures are ﬁnanced by levying income taxes and by issuing one-
period risk-free nominal bonds. We assume that the ﬁscal authority imposes a simple proportional rule for the tax rate: if real
debt is higher (lower) than in the steady state the tax rate rises (falls). We shall refer to the tax rate as ‘taxes’ and to the parameter2 Dynamic RE models with multiple discretionary equilibria are presented in King and Wolman (2004) and Blake and Kirsanova (forthcoming).
Lockwood and Philippopoulos (1994) and Albanesi et al. (2003) give examples of multiplicity in models with static expectations.
3 Discretionary policy with multiple equilibria generates data series which can be observed as satisfying a Markov-switching regime (Blake and
Kirsanova, forthcoming). There is much empirical evidence on such regimes; for one example which uses a similar model as we study here see Davig and
Leeper (2006).
4 Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) term limited commitment ‘quasi-commitment’ and Debertoli and Nunes (2010) use ‘loose commitment’. In this
paper we use these terms interchangeably.
5 Debertoli and Nunes (2010) use a non-linear model to illustrate a generalization of the quasi-commitment equilibrium concept to a non-linear
setting. Their model is not suitable for our analysis because of the assumption of non-linearity.
6 It was also used in Blake and Kirsanova (forthcoming) to demonstrate existence and investigate the properties of multiple equilibria under
discretionary policy.
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debt and, as we shall show, plays an important role in the model. The presence of the non-optimizing ﬁscal authority in the
economy is captured by this single feedback parameter m.
We assume that all public debt consist of riskless one-period bonds. Accordingly, the nominal value of end-of-period
public debt Bt evolves according to the following law of motion:
Bt ¼ ð1þ it1ÞBt1þPtGtUtPtYt , ð1Þ
where Ut represents the share of nominal income that the government taxes in period t. Gt denotes government purchases
which are exogenously given. The aggregate price level is denoted by Pt and the nominal interest rate of government bonds
is denoted by it. The national income identity yields
Yt ¼ CtþGt , ð2Þ
where Ct is private consumption. For analytical convenience, we deﬁne Bt ¼ ð1þ it1ÞBt1=Pt1 as a measure of real
government debt. Because Bt is observed at the beginning of period t, (1) can be rewritten as
Btþ1 ¼ ð1þ itÞ Bt
Pt1
Pt
UtYtþGt
 
: ð3Þ
We assume that ﬁscal policy is conducted according to a simple mechanistic feedback rule that relates the tax rate, Ut , to
the stock of real debt, Bt
Ut ¼ ~U Bt~B
 m ~B= ~Y
: ð4Þ
Here and below the tilde denotes the steady-state value of the corresponding variable in the model’s zero-inﬂation non-
stochastic steady state.
Log-linearizing (3) and (4) yields
btþ1 ¼
~B
~Y
itþ 1b ð1m
~UÞbt
~C
~Y
~Uct
~B
~Y
pt
 !
, ð5Þ
where bt ¼ ð ~B= ~Y Þ lnðBt= ~BÞ, ct ¼ lnðCt= ~C Þ and it ¼ lnðð1þ itÞ=ð1þ~ıÞÞ. The private sector’s discount factor, b, satisﬁes
b¼ 1=ð1þ~ıÞ. To make the model particularly simple we assume ~B ¼ 0, which eliminates the ﬁrst-order effect of the
interest rate and inﬂation on debt, and obtain the ﬁnal version of linearized debt accumulation equation
btþ1 ¼ rbtZct , ð6Þ
where the parameter r¼ ð1m ~UÞ=b is a function of the tax rate, implying that with stronger ﬁscal feedback m the stock of
real debt is stabilized more rapidly, and where the parameter Z¼ ~C ~U=ðb ~Y Þ describes the sensitivity of debt to the tax base.
The derivation of the appropriate Phillips curve is standard (Benigno and Woodford, 2003, Section A.5) and real
marginal cost is a function of output and taxes. Log-linearizing the price-setting-ﬁrms’ pricing decision around the zero-
inﬂation non-stochastic steady state yields the following New Keynesian Phillips curve
pt ¼ bEtptþ1þd
1
s þ
y
c
 
ctþ
~U
ð1 ~UÞ
tt
 !
þut ,
where d¼ ð1gbÞð1gÞc=gðcþEÞ is the slope of Phillips curve, tt ¼ lnðUt= ~UÞ, s is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution, c is the elasticity of labour supply, y¼ ~C= ~Y is the steady state consumption to output ratio and ut is an
AR(1) cost push shock with persistence parameter ru. Et is the expectation operator conditional on information available
at time t. Substituting the log-linearized Eqs. (2) and (4) into the Phillips curve yields
pt ¼ bEtptþ1þkctþnbtþut , ð7Þ
where n¼ mk ~U=ð1 ~UÞ and k¼ dð1=sþy=cÞ.
In summary, the model is described by the debt accumulation Eq. (6) and the Phillips curve (7). The aggregate agents’
decision variable is inﬂation, pt , and the initial state, b0 ¼ b, is known to all agents. We assume that the policy maker
chooses consumption ct. In contrast to the standard NK model (used in Schaumburg and Tambalotti, 2007) the next-period
predetermined state variable, btþ1, is affected by policy, ct.
The intertemporal welfare criterion of the policymaker is deﬁned by the following quadratic objective:
L¼ 1
2
Et
X1
t ¼ 0
btðp2t þlc2t Þ: ð8Þ
This criterion is microfounded and derived under the assumption of a steady state labour subsidy, in the absence of
technology and taste shocks.7 Parameter l is a function of model parameters, l¼ yk=E, and E is the elasticity of substitution
between any pair of monopolistically produced goods.
The policy maker knows the laws of motion (6) and (7) of the aggregate economy and takes them into account when
formulating policy.
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We shall compare the dynamics of the model under quasi-commitment policy with dynamics under the two limiting
cases, discretion and commitment.8 This Section gives all necessary deﬁnitions and presents solutions to these two
limiting cases in a comparable form using the model above as an example.
3.1. Discretionary policy
Under discretion there is a sequence of policy makers: each period a new policy maker arrives in ofﬁce. The new policy
maker chooses the best policy knowing that he stays in ofﬁce for only one period and the next-period’s policy maker will
re-optimize again.9 The law of motion of the aggregate economy (6) and (7) is known by the policy maker and taken into
account when he formulates the optimal policy. Furthermore, the policy maker ﬁnds the best action every period and
knows that future policy makers have the freedom to change policy, but will apply the same decision process. At every
point in time t the decision rules of each agent are linear functions of the current state
ct ¼ cuutþcbbt , ð9Þ
pt ¼ puutþpbbt : ð10Þ
Note that from
Etptþ1 ¼Eq: ð10ÞpuEtutþ1þpbbtþ1 ¼Eq: ð6ÞpuruutþpbðrbtZctÞ
¼Eq: ð7Þ 1
b
pt
k
b
ct
n
b
bt
1
b
ut ,
it follows that the private sector’s decision can also be written as
pt ¼ ðbpuruþ1ÞutþðbrpbþnÞbtþðkbZpbÞct : ð11Þ
The policy maker moves ﬁrst within each period and the private sector observes the action of the policy maker. Thus, the
private sector takes into account the ‘instantaneous’ inﬂuence of the policy choice measured by ðkbZpbÞ.
We can give now a more precise deﬁnition of discretionary policy: a policy determined by (9) is discretionary if the
policy maker ﬁnds it optimal to follow it in every period s4t, given the private sector (i) observes the current policy,
(ii) knows that future policy makers re-optimize and use the same decision process, and (iii) expects policy (9) will be
implemented in all future periods.
We can write the criterion for optimality as
Suuu
2
t þ2SubutbtþSbbb2t ¼minct ððp
2
t þlc2t ÞþbðSuuu2tþ1þ2Subutþ1btþ1þSbbb2tþ1ÞÞ, ð12Þ
subject to constraints (6) and (11).
One can solve the problem using Lagrange multipliers. The expected Lagrangian can be written as
Ldt ¼ 12 ðp2t þlc2t Þþb12ðSuur2uu2t þ2Subruutbtþ1þSbbb2tþ1Þþxtþ1ðrbtZctbtþ1Þ
þftþ1ðptkctnbtutbðpuruutþpbbtþ1ÞÞ: ð13Þ
This approach exploits the intertemporal representation (6) and (7) together with the underlying assumption that the
private sector’s expectations about its own future decisions will be necessarily a function of the future state.
Only current period constraints matter for the policy maker and the ﬁrst order conditions can be written as
0¼ bSbbbtþ1þbSubruutxtþ1bpbftþ1, ð14Þ
0¼ ptþftþ1, ð15Þ
0¼ lctZxtþ1kftþ1, ð16Þ
0¼ rbtZctbtþ1, ð17Þ
0¼ bpbbtþ1þkctþnbtptþð1þbpuruÞut : ð18Þ7 For a derivation see Kirsanova and Wren-Lewis (2012). Of course we could get technology and taste shocks and reinterpret the log-linearized
variables as ‘gap’ variables.
8 In this section we largely follow the approach and results in Blake and Kirsanova (forthcoming) and in Kirsanova and Wren-Lewis (2012), but
present the results in a form that is most convenient for our purposes.
9 Our deﬁnition of discretionary policy is standard and follows Oudiz and Sachs (1985), Backus and Drifﬁll (1986) and Clarida et al. (1999).
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cu ¼
ððkbpbZÞðbpuruþ1ÞZbSubruÞ
ðbZ2SbbþðkbZpbÞ2þlÞ
, ð19Þ
cb ¼
ððkbpbZÞðbpbrþnÞZbSbbrÞ
ðbZ2SbbþðkbZpbÞ2þlÞ
, ð20Þ
and so the components of the value function satisfy the following equations
Suuu¼ ððbpuruþ1ÞþðkbpbZÞcuÞ2þlc2uþbðr2Suu2rZSubcuþZ2Sbbc2uÞ, ð21Þ
SZb ¼ ððbpuruþ1ÞþðkbpbZÞcuÞððbrpbþnÞþðkbZpbÞcbÞ
þlcucbþbSubruðrZcbÞbSbbZcuðrZcbÞ, ð22Þ
Sbb ¼ ððbrpbþnÞþðkbZpbÞcbÞ2þbSbbðrZcbÞ2þlc2b : ð23Þ
This yields the following coefﬁcients in (10):
pu ¼ bpuruþ1þðkbZpbÞcu, ð24Þ
pb ¼ brpbþnþðkbZpbÞcb: ð25Þ
The coefﬁcients fcu,cb,pu,pb, Suu,Sub,Sbbg describe the solution to the discretionary optimization problem outlined above.
They uniquely deﬁne the trajectories fbt ,pt ,ctg1t ¼ 0 for any given b0 ¼ b. Conversely, if the sequence fbt ,pt ,ctg1t ¼ 0 solves the
discretionary policy outlined above, then there is a unique set of coefﬁcients fcu,cb,pu,pb, Suu,Sub,Sbbg that satisﬁes
Eqs. (19)–(25). We call the set of coefﬁcients fcu,cb,pu,pb,Suu,Sub,Sbbg a discretionary equilibrium.
Note that the discretionary equilibrium is fully characterized by the deterministic component of the solution,
fpb,cb,Sbbg. Indeed, we can solve system (19)–(25) in a recursive way. We ﬁrst solve (20), (23) and (25) for fcb,pb,Sbbg
and then solve the rest of the system for the stochastic component of the solution. We use this well known fact to ﬁnd all
discretionary equilibria in the following simple and illustrative way.10
Suppose the policy maker guesses the response of the private sector to the state, pb. Then the optimal discretionary
policy is given by the pair (20) and (23). We ﬁnd cb and therefore the optimal response pnb of the private sector is given
by (25). Then, for every – not necessarily optimal – pb we can compute a unique pnb and plot the dependence p
n
bðpbÞ, see the
ﬁrst panel in Fig. 1, Panel I. Clearly, if pb ¼ pnb we have a solution to the discretionary problem.
Our benchmark calibration is standard and follows Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) and Blake and Kirsanova
(forthcoming). The model’s frequency is quarterly. The subjective discount rate b is set to 0.99, the government share of
total output 1r is 0.25. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution s is 1/2, the Frisch elasticity of labor supply j¼ 1=2,
and the elasticity of demand E¼ 5. The Calvo parameter g¼ 0:75 and the cost-push shock is an exogenous process with
standard deviation 0.005 and ru ¼ 0. Finally, the most crucial parameter for our results is the ﬁscal feedback, m. The recent
empirical evidence suggests that, although the strength of ﬁscal feedback varies across countries and with time,
the chosen value of m¼ 0:05 is realistic. See e.g. Leeper et al. (2010) who ﬁnd a reaction of labour taxes to debt of about
0.05 percentage points for the post-1960 period in the US; see also Coenen and Straub (2005) and Forni et al. (2009) who
estimate the response of taxes to debt for the Euro Area.
For our baseline calibration the graph of pnbðpbÞ intersects the 451 line in three points labelled A, B and C, so we have
three discretionary policy equilibria.11 A moderate inﬂation, set by the ﬁrms in response to a given debt level, pb, increases
the marginal return to a policy decision that increases consumption in response to this level of debt, cb. Higher
consumption raises demand and ﬁrms will increase their response to debt, pnb. This complementarity ensures the steepness
of pnbðpbÞ and three equilibria arise.
The three equilibria, whose characteristics are presented in Table 1 result in qualitatively and quantitatively different
dynamics of the economy. Fig. 2, which shows the responses of key variables to a unit markup shock for equilibria A and C
(as equilibrium B is similar to equilibrium A for the benchmark calibration) using dotted lines with markers.12 Focusing
ﬁrst on equilibrium A, inﬂation rises following the markup shock and the policy response is to defer consumption
(by raising the nominal interest rate sufﬁciently high, this is implicit in our model). The decline in consumption lowers
output and government tax revenues, which leads to a rise in government debt. In subsequent periods, although interest
rates are lowered to stimulate the economy and bring it out of recession, government debt is brought back to baseline
predominantly through (primary) ﬁscal surpluses, rather than through a decline in the cost of ﬁnancing government debt.10 See Anderson et al. (1996) on certainty equivalence in this class of models and Blake and Kirsanova (forthcoming) for explicit formulae for
stochastic components as functions of deterministic components for discretionary models.
11 The graph is continuous. This is because the denominator of (20) is always positive: Sbb40, and l40 (see Blake and Kirsanova, forthcoming). In
order to ﬁnd points of intersection we note that pnbðpbÞpb changes sign in these points. We obtain the solutions with the tolerance level 1e-12.
12 These impulse responses are identical in each panel.
−0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
πb
1/2
π
b1/
2*
III: QUASI−COMMITMENT, α = 1/2
−0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
πb
1/4
π
b1/
4*
V: QUASI−COMMITMENT, α = 1/4
−0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
πb
π
b*
I: DISCRETION
B
C
A
B
C
A
A
−0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
πb
π
b*
II: COMMITMENT
−0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
πb
1
π
b1*
IV: QUASI−COMMITMENT, α → 1
−0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
πb
1/8
π
b1/
8*
VI: QUASI−COMMITMENT, α = 1/8
A
A
A
B
C
Fig. 1. Multiple policy equilibria for different degrees of precommitment.
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marginal costs, and causes inﬂation to rise by more than it otherwise would. This monetary policy causes tax revenues to rise
and leads to a decline in government debt. To stabilize government debt, future policy makers raise the cost of ﬁnancing
government debt, which causes consumption, output, and real marginal costs to decline and places downward pressure on
inﬂation. In the spirit of Leeper (1991) monetary policy can be thought of as being active in equilibria A and B and passive in
equilibrium C. Table 1 reveals this trade-off between the response to government debt and the response to the markup shock:
The more ‘actively’ the policy maker behaves, the stronger is the policy-induced recession in response to the mark-up shock.3.2. Commitment policy
Under the full commitment policy the policy maker optimizes only once, in the initial moment. He chooses a
contingency plan, which is than applied indeﬁnitely but can be implemented sequentially. If there is a change of policy
makers, the subsequent policy maker continues the policy of its predecessor; therefore we can assume that there is only
Table 1
Properties of discretionary equilibria in the NK model with debt accumulation.
Eq. (A) Eq. (B) Eq. (C)
Characteristics of discretionary policy equilibria
(1) Policy reaction ½cu cb ½4:8 0:02 ½4:5 0:01 ½0:4 1:9
(2) Private sector reaction ½pu pb  ½0:7 0:01 ½0:8 0:02 ½1:0 0:3
(3) Value function Suu Sub
Sub Sbb
" #
0:73 0:01
0:01 0:0004
 
0:76 0:02
0:02 0:01
 
1:00 0:28
0:28 0:17
 
(4) Normalized loss L 1.3326 1.3872 1.8283
Characteristics of commitment policy equilibrium
(5) Policy reaction ½cu cb cf ½3:6 0:01 3:6 – –
(6) Private sector reaction ½pu pb pf ½0:5 0:002 0:45 – –
(7) Normalized loss L 1.0 – –
Degree of precommitment required to select the best equilibrium
(8) Duration of commitment period to select Eq. A 1=a quarters 7 – –
C. Himmels, T. Kirsanova / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 37 (2013) 649–665 655one policy maker which takes ofﬁce in period zero and stays inﬁnitely. When optimizing, the policy maker internalizes the
effect of its choice on private sector’s expectations and solves the following Lagrangian
Lc ¼
X1
t ¼ 0
bt
1
2
ðp2t þlc2t Þþxtþ1ðrbtZctbtþ1Þþftþ1ðptkctnbtutbptþ1Þ
 
:
The corresponding ﬁrst order conditions are
0¼xtþrbxtþ1nbftþ1, ð26Þ
0¼ ptþftþ1ft , ð27Þ
0¼ lctZxtþ1kftþ1, ð28Þ
0¼ rbtZctbtþ1, ð29Þ
0¼ bptþ1þkctþnbtþutpt , ð30Þ
for tZ0; with initial conditions b0 ¼ b and f0 ¼ 0, and the transversality condition limt-1bto1.
The solution to the commitment problem can be written in the following linear form:
pt ¼ puutþpbbtþpfft , ð31Þ
ct ¼ cuutþcbbtþcfft , ð32Þ
xt ¼ xuutþxbbtþxfft , ð33Þ
where the coefﬁcients satisfy the following algebraic matrix Riccati equation (see Appendix A for details):
cu cb cf
pu pb pf
xu xb xf
2
64
3
75¼
lþZ2xb kþZxf 0
bZpbk bpfþ1 0
bZrxb bðnrxfÞ 1
2
664
3
775
1

Zxuru Zrxb kþZxf
brupuþ1 nþbrpb bpf
brxuru br2xb bðnrxfÞ
2
664
3
775, ð34Þ
and the components of the value function S satisfy the following algebraic matrix Riccati equation:
Suu Sub Suf
Sub Sbb Sbf
Suf Sbf Sff
2
64
3
75¼
p2uþlc2u pbpuþlcbcu pupfþlcucf
pbpuþlcbcu p2bþlc2b pbpfþlcbcf
pupfþlcucf pbpfþlcbcf p2fþlc2f
2
664
3
775
þb
ru Zcu pu
0 rZcb pb
0 Zcf 1pf
2
64
3
75
Suu Sub Suf
Sub Sbb Sbf
Suf Sbf Sff
2
64
3
75
ru 0 0
Zcu rZcb Zcf
pu pb 1pf
2
64
3
75: ð35Þ
A set of coefﬁcients fpu,pb,pf,cu,cb,cf,xu,xb,xf,Suu,Sub,Suf,Sbb,Sbf,Sffg which solves system (34) and (35) deﬁnes a
trajectory fbt ,pt ,ctg1t ¼ 0 which solves system (26)–(30) for any given b0 ¼ b. Conversely, if a sequence fbt ,pt ,ctg1t ¼ 0 solves
system (26)–(30), then its parameters fpu, pb, pf, cu, cb, cf, xu, xb, xf, Suu, Sub, Suf, Sbb, Sbf, Sffg satisﬁes Eqs. (34) and (35).
We call the set of coefﬁcients fpu, pb, pf, cu, cb, cf, xu, xb, xf, Suu, Sub, Suf, Sbb, Sbf, Sffg a commitment equilibrium.
Writing the solution in form (31)–(33) allows us to compare it with the discretionary solution. Again, suppose the
response of the private sector to debt, pb, is given. We can guess the other feedback coefﬁcients in the system (31)–(33)
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Fig. 2. Impulse responses to a 1% cost push shock in the model with government debt. (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure caption,
the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
C. Himmels, T. Kirsanova / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 37 (2013) 649–665656and iterate the Riccati equation (34) as suggested in Appendix A, but do not update pb. If the procedure converges, we have
obtained the optimal response of the policy maker to the private sector decision, provided that the private sector responds
to the Lagrange multiplier (set by the policy maker) in an optimal way. Then, we iterate the Riccati equation (34) once
again to obtain pnb. A solution to the commitment problem implies p
n
b ¼ pb. The graph of pnbðpbÞ intersects the 451 line in
one point labelled A, see the second panel in Fig. 1, and we can verify with standard methods (e.g. So¨derlind (1999)) that
this point is, indeed, a solution. For the baseline calibration the economy is stabilized by the policy maker in the unique
equilibrium A.
Fig. 2 reports the responses of all variables to a positive unit cost push shock. Under commitment (the blue dotted line
with x-markers) the policy maker engineers a fall in private consumption, which will dampen marginal costs. Although the
dynamics of the economy is very similar to the one in discretionary equilibrium A, in contrast to this discretionary
equilibrium, the policy maker keeps consumption below the steady state for several periods. Such a policy allows the
C. Himmels, T. Kirsanova / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 37 (2013) 649–665 657policy maker to lower expected future inﬂation and ensures price stability in the long run. Government debt initially
increases due to the fall in consumption, but is brought back to the steady state with higher taxes.
4. Quasi-commitment policy
This Section studies monetary policy within a limited commitment framework. We discuss the continuum of
intermediate cases between commitment and discretion. We want to understand (i) how a ‘quasi-commitment bridge’
links the economy under commitment and under discretion when multiple equilibria exist and (ii) how effectively quasi-
commitment helps to select the best equilibrium.
4.1. Existence of multiple policy equilibria
A quasi-commitment policy, as introduced in Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007), also assumes sequential policy
making. A new policy maker is appointed with a constant and exogenous probability a every period. When a new policy
maker arrives in ofﬁce, he reneges on the promises of his predecessor and commits to a new policy plan that is optimal at
the time of the change. All agents understand the possibility and the nature of this change and form expectations
accordingly. The private sector knows that a new policy maker will re-optimize, therefore it doubts the reliability of
outstanding promises.
As in Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) and Debertoli and Nunes (2010) we assume that the policy maker’s tenure in
ofﬁce depends on a sequence of exogenous i.i.d. Bernoulli signals fOtgtZ0 with E½Ot ¼ a. If a¼ 1 the policy authority acts
under full discretion and every period a new policy maker arrives in ofﬁce and re-optimizes the planning problem. If a¼ 0
the policy maker stays in ofﬁce inﬁnitely long and keeps his promises.
Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) and Debertoli and Nunes (2010) demonstrate that the optimization problem under
limited commitment can be expressed by the following Lagrangian:
Lqc ¼
X1
t ¼ 0
ðbð1aÞÞt 1
2
ðp2t þlc2t þbaðSauuu2tþ1þ2Saubutþ1btþ1þSabbb2tþ1Þ
 
þftþ1ðptkctnbtutbð1aÞptþ1bapabbtþ1bapauutþ1Þþxtþ1ðrbtZctbtþ1ÞÞ, ð36Þ
for 0rao1. Here we use superscript a to denote parameters of solution to the limited commitment problem. The ﬁrst
order conditions are
0¼ baSaubutþbaSabbbtxtþrbð1aÞxtþ1nbð1aÞftþ1bapabft , ð37Þ
0¼ ptþftþ1ft , ð38Þ
0¼ lctZxtþ1kftþ1, ð39Þ
0¼ rbtZctbtþ1, ð40Þ
0¼ bð1aÞptþ1þbapabbtþ1þkctþnbtþðbapauruþ1Þutpt , ð41Þ
for tZ0, with initial conditions b0 ¼ b and f0 ¼ 0, and the transversality condition limt-1bto1. These ﬁrst order
conditions are similar to those for commitment, but depend additionally on the parameters fpab ,Sabb,Saubg. These parameters
are a part of solution to the limited commitment problem as we explain next.
A solution to system (37)–(41) can be written in the following linear form (see Appendix B for details):
pt ¼ pauutþpabbtþpafft , ð42Þ
ct ¼ cauutþcabbtþcafft , ð43Þ
xt ¼ xauutþxabbtþxafft , ð44Þ
where coefﬁcients fpau ,pab ,paf,cau ,cab ,cafg solve the following algebraic Riccati equation:
cau c
a
b c
a
f
pau pab p
a
f
xau x
a
b x
a
f
2
664
3
775¼
lþZ2xab kþZxaf 0
bZpabk ð1aÞbpafþ1 0
bZrxabð1aÞ bðrxafnÞð1aÞ 1
2
664
3
775
1

Zxauru Zrx
a
b kþZxaf
brupauþ1 nþbrpab bpafð1aÞ
bðaSabuþð1aÞrxauruÞ bðaSabbþð1aÞr2xabÞ bðð1aÞðrxafnÞapab Þ
2
664
3
775, ð45Þ
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a
bb are a part of the solution to the following matrix equation:
Sauu S
a
ub S
a
uf
Saub S
a
bb S
a
bf
Sauf S
a
bf S
a
ff
2
664
3
775¼
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775: ð46Þ
Coefﬁcients fpu,pb,pf,cu,cb,cf,xu,xb,xf,Suu,Sub,Suf,Sbb,Sbf,Sffg uniquely deﬁne the trajectories fbt ,pt ,ctg1t ¼ 0 which solve
system (37)–(41) for any given b0 ¼ b. Conversely, if the sequence fbt ,pt ,ctg1t ¼ 0 solves system (37)–(41), then there is a
unique set of coefﬁcients fpu, pb, pf, cu, cb, cf, xu, xb, xf, Suu, Sub, Suf, Sbb, Sbf, Sffg that satisﬁes Eqs. (45) and (46). We call
the set of coefﬁcients fpu, pb, pf, cu, cb, cf, xu, xb, xf, Suu, Sub, Suf, Sbb, Sbf, Sffg a limited commitment equilibrium.
We can plot the solution to system (45) and (46) using the same approach as we used for commitment in Section 3.2.
Suppose we guess the response of the private sector to the state variable, pab . Then, we can iterate system (45) and (46), but
do not update pab . If the procedure has converged, we iterate it once to obtain the update p
an
b . Solutions to the system (45)
and (46) will be among the points where panb ¼ pab .
For the baseline calibration of a¼ 1=2 (which implies an average regime duration of two quarters) the graph of
p1=2nb ðp
1=2
b Þ intersects the 451 line in three points labelled A, B and C, see the third panel in Fig. 1.13 Therefore, if we move
from the case of pure discretionary policy to the case were the policy maker stays in ofﬁce on average for two periods then
all three equilibria survive.
The survival of all discretionary equilibria under some degree of precommitment is not obvious. Note that if a¼ 1, the
policy maker defaults with certainty every period. Then, the Lagrangian (36) takes the form of (13), which describes
the discretionary optimization problem. The ﬁrst order conditions for the limited commitment optimization problem
(37)–(41) are left-discontinuous at point a¼ 1. System (37)–(41) does not collapse to (14)–(18) as taking the limit a-1 in
system (37)–(41) does not eliminate the Lagrange multiplier on the previous-period constraint ft in Eq. (38). Because for
any ao1 the private sector does not expect the occurrence of default with certainty in the next period, this property holds
at the limit and implies discontinuity of the ﬁrst order conditions. Nevertheless, the number of equilibrium is a locally
continuous function of a at a¼ 1, as we prove next.
Proposition 1. Assume that all roots of the polynomial system (19)–(25) are of multiplicity one so that there are K 2 f1,3g
distinct solutions under discretionary policy. There exists a, 0oao1 such that if a 2 ða,1 then there are as many quasi-
commitment policy equilibria as under discretion.
Proof. First, we prove that the system of ﬁrst order conditions to the limited commitment problem, taken at the limit
a-1, has as many solutions as has the system of ﬁrst order conditions to the discretionary problem.
Indeed, taking the limit a-1 of system (45) and (46) we obtain system the following system:
S1u ¼ ðp1uÞ2þlðc1uÞ2þbðr2uS1uþZ2ðc1uÞ2S1bb2Zruc1uS1buÞ, ð47Þ
Sub ¼ p1bp1uþlc1bc1uþbruðrZc1bÞS1ubþbZc1uðZc1brÞS1bb, ð48Þ
Sbb ¼ ðp1bÞ2þlðc1bÞ2þbðrþZc1bÞ2S1bb, ð49Þ
ZbS1buru ¼ kp1uþlc1uþZ2bS1bbc1uZbp1bp1u, ð50Þ
ZrbS1bb ¼ kp1bþlc1bþZ2bS1bbc1bZbp1bp1b , ð51Þ
brup
1
uþ1¼ p1ukc1uþbZp1bc1u , ð52Þ
nþbrp1b ¼ p1bkc1bþbZp1bc1b , ð53Þ
x1u ¼ bS1bu, x1b ¼ bS1bb, x1f ¼bp1b , p1f ¼
ðkZbp1bÞ2
ððkZbp1bÞ2þlþZ2bS
1
bbÞ
, ð54Þ
c1f ¼
kZbp1b
ððkZbp1bÞ2þlþZ2bS1bbÞ
, S1ff ¼
ðkZbp1bÞ2
ððkZbp1bÞ2þlþZ2bS1bbÞ
, ð55Þ13 Again, we can verify with standard methods (based on Oudiz and Sachs, 1985 and Backus and Drifﬁll, 1986, and discussed in Appendix C) that
these are indeed solutions to the optimization problem.
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p1uðkZbp1bÞþc1uðlþbZ2S1bbÞbZruS1bu
ððkZbp1bÞ2þlþZ2bS1bbÞ
, ð56Þ
S1bf ¼ ðkZbp1bÞ
p1bðkZbp1bÞþc1bðlþbZ2SÞ1bbbZrS1bb
ððkZbp1bÞ2þlþZ2bS1bbÞ
, ð57Þ
which can be split into two sub-systems, (47)–(53) and (54)–(57). The ﬁrst sub-system (47)–(53) does not depend on
fp1f,c1f,x
1
u ,x
1
b ,x
1
f,S
1
uf,S
1
bf,S
1
ffg; and it is equivalent to system (19)–(25), which determines solution to the discretionary
problem, fpu,pb,cu,cb,Suu,Sub,Sbbg. The second sub-system (54)–(57) is linear in variables fp1f,c1f,x
1
u,x
1
b ,x
1
f,S
1
uf,S
1
bf,S
1
ffg
and has a unique solution given fp1u ,p1b ,c1u,c1b ,S1uu,S1ub,S1bbg. If follows that the solutions to system (19)–(25) and to system
(47)–(57) are identical.
Second, we prove that the system of ﬁrst order conditions to the limited commitment problem has the same number of
solutions in some neighborhood of a¼ 1.
Indeed, system (45) and (46) is a polynomial system in fp,c,Sg, which coefﬁcients are polynomial functions of a.
Therefore, all solutions to (45) and (46) at a¼ 1 are continuous functions in a. For any solution j, j 2 f1,3g, to system (45)
and (46) for a¼ 1 there exists a ajo1 such that solution j is a continuous function of a for a 2 ðaj,1. A solution which
exists for a¼ 1 also exists for a 2 ða,1 where a ¼maxjfajg. If there are K solutions to (45) and (46) for a 2 ða,1, then there
are K paths which solve (37)–(41) for a 2 ða,1.
Therefore, the system of the ﬁrst order conditions to the limited commitment problem has as many solutions as has the
system of ﬁrst order conditions to the discretionary problem if a 2 ða,1. &
We plot the case a-1 in the fourth panel in Fig. 1. The p1nb ðp1bÞ line intersects the 451 line in three points, which are the
same points as under pure discretion.14
In Fig. 2 we show the responses of all variables to a positive 1% cost push shock under a quasi-commitment policy. We
set a¼ 1=2, which implies average regime duration of two quarters. We also demonstrate impulse responses under
commitment and discretion (equilibria A and C).
Panel I of Fig. 2 shows the impulse response functions of Type (i).15 These impulse responses demonstrate the evolution
of the economy if no reoptimization happens over the horizon of interest, while the private sector expects them to happen
every period with probability 1/2. In this scenario a central banker stays in ofﬁce unexpectedly long, which becomes more
and more unrealistic over time. To generate these impulse responses we use the transition matrix given by the conditions
(37)–(41). Similar to discretion we plot the two quasi-commitment equilibria A and C. We use solid and dash-dotted lines
correspondingly. Compared to the full commitment policy, quasi-commitment policy in the active monetary policy
equilibrium A delivers a stronger and longer lasting decrease in consumption. As reoptimizations are expected to happen
the price setters expect future policy makers to increase consumption and therefore expect a high inﬂation in the future.
Therefore, if the policy maker wants to exploit private sector expectations he has to pay a higher cost in from of a stronger
recession. In the absence of reoptimizations this results in stronger future deﬂation and higher debt, compared to
commitment.
Type (i) impulse responses under quasi-commitment policy in equilibrium C are explosive. In this case the ‘passive’
monetary policy is not able to stabilize inﬂation, while trying to keep debt under control. After the shock occurred the
policy maker cannot move consumption by much, since he has to avoid excessive debt accumulation. This behavior is
similar to the one in discretionary equilibrium C. Because the private sector expects defaults in the future and hence high
future inﬂation, inﬂation can only be controlled with low demand. However, lower consumption would result in excessive
debt accumulation. Therefore, the reduction in consumption counteracts the effort of the central bank to ensure ﬁscal
solvency and therefore the economy exhibits explosive behavior. As the fourth chart in the ﬁrst panel shows, the Lagrange
multiplier ft which measures the shadow price of controlling the private sector inﬂation expectations is much higher in
equilibrium C and explodes with time.16 The result is not surprising, given that the monetary policy maker has to control
debt in the passive equilibrium. This task becomes incompatible with inﬂation stabilization if expected defaults do not
happen.17
Impulse responses of Type (ii) in Panel II of Fig. 2 characterize a more typical behavior of the economy under quasi-
commitment. Suppose reoptimizations happen in periods 2, 3, 6 and 8 after the initial shock. In each of these periods the
reoptimizing policy maker reneges on the plan of its predecessor. When the policy maker defaults on the promises of his
predecessor, he resets the predetermined Lagrange multiplier to zero. The policy maker takes this opportunity to end the
promised recession of his predecessor and raises consumption back to its initial level. The increase in consumption also
leads to a faster reduction of government debt.14 The shape of p1nb ðp1b Þ is different than in Panel I because we take into account the Lagrange multipliers when computing p1nb ðp1b Þ. But in equilibrium
p1b ¼ pb .
15 The categorization of the impulse response functions follows Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007).
16 This Lagrange multiplier is set on the Phillips curve in the optimization problem of the policy maker.
17 Using an analogy with a roulette game, system (37)–(41) describes the history when ‘red’ never realizes while it is expected – and it is bet on –
with probability 1/2.
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over the distribution of the corresponding reoptimization draws. Therefore, they demonstrate the expected evolution of
the system following the initial shock. Naturally, they are in between the IRF of the respective discretionary equilibria and
the IRF under full commitment.
4.2. Equilibrium selectionProposition 2. There exists a, 0oar1 such that if (i) a 2 ½0,aÞ and (ii) a quasi-commitment equilibrium exists, than the
equilibrium is unique.
Proof. Under commitment the policy equilibrium in LQ RE models, if it exists, is always unique, see e.g. Backus and Drifﬁll
(1986).18 Eqs. (45) and (46) determine the parameters of the solution to the limited commitment problem. Eq. (46) collapses to a
symmetric discrete algebraic Riccati equation for the value function if a-0; this equation is known to have a unique symmetric
positive semi-deﬁnite solution, see e.g. Lancaster and Rodman (1995). Eq. (45) collapses to a Riccati equation (34) if a-0; if a
solution to this equation exists, it is unique. System (45) and (46) is a polynomial system in fpk,ck,xkgk2fu,b,fg, and in components
of S, which coefﬁcients are polynomial functions of a. Therefore, all solutions to (45) and (46) at a¼ 0 are continuous functions in
a. If a solution to system (45) and (46) exists for a¼ 0 there exists a a40 such that the solution is a continuous functions of a for
a 2 ½0,aÞ. These three solutions determine three paths which solve (26)–(30) for a 2 ½0,aÞ. &
By continuity the selected equilibrium is always Pareto-optimal because the commitment equilibrium, to which the
selected equilibrium converges at the limit, delivers the lowest loss. The value of a which selects the unique equilibrium can
be smaller than the value of a which ensures the same number of equilibria as under discretion. How big are these values
for our model? In particular, what is the sufﬁcient degree of precommitment a such that only one equilibrium survives?
Panel I in Fig. 3 plots the expected welfare loss for each equilibrium as a function of the average duration of the period
of precommitment 1=a for a given ﬁscal feedback parameter m¼ 0:05. In the case of pure discretion (a¼ 1) we have three
equilibria denoted by triangular markers. With higher degrees of precommitment all three equilibria survive. The losses in
the corresponding equilibria are marked with crosses. Panel I suggests that for the benchmark value of the ﬁscal feedback
parameter the worst and the middle equilibria are eliminated if a ¼ a ¼ 1=8, as we also report in row (7) of Table 1. If the
policy maker stays in the ofﬁce only for two years on average this will guarantee the unique equilibrium under quasi-
commitment policy.19
To summarize, only a relatively small degree of commitment is required to select the best equilibrium. If a limited
commitment technology is available, then it is a more powerful selection mechanism than a formation of a coalition of
consequent discretionary policy makers, see Dennis and Kirsanova (2009). If consequent policy makers form coalitions and
reoptimize under discretion only in the ﬁrst period of each coalition tenure, sticking to the same time-consistent policy
between reoptimizations, it requires a tenure period of three years to select the best equilibrium in this model.20 An access to
the limited commitment technology reduces the necessary tenure period which is required to avoid falling into an
expectation trap. Panel I in Fig. 3 shows that for m¼ 0:05 multiplicity is eliminated, if a policy maker can commit on average
for 2 years.21 Moreover, and more generally, Proposition 2 claims that there is some sufﬁcient degree of commitment which
will certainly select the Pareto-preferred equilibrium (if the corresponding commitment equilibrium exists), while no
coalition of discretionary policy makers might exist to select it (Dennis and Kirsanova, 2009).
Panel II in Fig. 3 investigates the robustness of the above result for different values of the ﬁscal feedback parameter m,
which is crucial for multiplicity. We concentrate on the range of the ﬁscal feedback m which generates multiplicity of
quasi-commitment equilibria for a given average regime duration, 1=a. For every (discrete) regime duration the square
marker denotes the minimum level of m above which there is a unique equilibrium characterized by an ‘active’ monetary
policy. The area below the round markers displays unique equilibria characterized by a ‘passive’ monetary policy. In the
area between the two markers we observe multiplicity of policy equilibria. Panel II demonstrates that with longer periods
of precommitment the area of multiplicity shrinks very quickly: if the average period of precommitment is more than ﬁve
years then expectation traps only exist for very small and empirically irrelevant values of the ﬁscal feedback m.
Parameter m is crucial for multiplicity and, as we argued in Section 3.1, the range of ﬁscal feedbacks in Panel II in Fig. 3
is empirically relevant. The baseline value of m¼ 0:05 creates multiplicity under pure discretionary policy. However, it is
enough for a policy maker to stay in the ofﬁce for two years in order to select the best equilibrium.
Our results are robust to different calibrations of other parameters of the model. Two parameters were found to affect
the quantitative results most. More myopic agents (i.e. lower b) put higher relative weight on stabilization of the economy18 A commitment policy which stabilises the economy may not exist, see Appendix A.
19 Panel I in Fig. 3 also demonstrates that the welfare loss is quickly reduced for a higher degree of precommitment. The initial gap between the loss
in the best discretionary equilibrium A and commitment is nearly halved after one year of precommitment. A further reduction in a demonstrates that
the gains from even minimal levels of credibility are substantial.
20 For the base line calibration of the model with m¼ 0:05.
21 Our numerical experiments with different (and more complex) models show consistently that the best equilibrium is selected only after a few
periods of precommitment.
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because in this equilibrium the adjustment is relatively slow. Differently, a higher degree of price stickiness (bigger Calvo
parameter g) slows the adjustment process down and eliminates the bad equilibrium for high values of m. However, the
shape of the curve in Panel I of Fig. 3 stays in both cases the same and quantitative differences are not very large.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we study monetary policy in a limited commitment framework using a simple New Keynesian model with
government debt. We show by example the existence of multiple equilibria under quasi-commitment policy using a model
with government debt accumulation. We demonstrate the existence of expectation traps similar to those under pure
discretionary policy. Because the private sector expects eventual re-optimizations to happen the current policy maker
formulates its policy based on the forecast of the private sector about future policy makers’ behavior. We ﬁnd that there
can be at least as many limited commitment policy equilibria as in the corresponding discretionary policy problem.
Although the previously developed equilibrium selection mechanism may suggest that economic agents are likely to
coordinate on the best equilibrium, our example demonstrates that a limited commitment technology helps the policy
maker to avoid falling into an expectation trap even if the degree of precommitment is very small.
In this paper we also provide an algorithm for computing quasi-commitment equilibria in the general class of LQ RE
models with endogenous state variables and with exogenous probability of default. We leave the numerical investigation
of properties of quasi-commitment policy in a wider class of non-linear dynamic models for future research. This research
might investigate how much commitment is required to select the best equilibrium in a King and Wolman (2004) type of
model with multiple discretionary equilibria. Once a robust algorithm to solve non-linear models is developed, future
research will be able to endogenize the probability of default along the lines suggested in Debertoli and Nunes (2010).Acknowledgments
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When optimizing, the policy maker internalizes the effect of its choice on private sector’s expectations and solves the
following Lagrangian
Lc ¼
X1
t ¼ 0
bt
1
2
ðp2t þlc2t Þþxtþ1ðrbtZctbtþ1Þþftþ1ðptkctnbtutbptþ1Þ
 
:
The corresponding ﬁrst order conditions are
0¼xtþrbxtþ1nbftþ1, ð58Þ
0¼ ptþftþ1ft , ð59Þ
0¼ lctZxtþ1kftþ1, ð60Þ
0¼ rbtZctbtþ1, ð61Þ
0¼ bptþ1þkctþnbtþutpt , ð62Þ
for tZ0; with initial conditions b0 ¼ b and f0 ¼ 0, and the transversality condition limt-1bto1.
Assume that ra0 and Za0 in system (6) and (7). Then the system (6) and (7) is controllable, and there always exists
a unique path fct ,pt ,btgtZ0 which (i) satisﬁes system (58)–(62) and the initial conditions and (ii) all eigenvalues of the
resulting transition matrix are less than 1=
ﬃﬃﬃ
b
p
in modulus (see, e.g. Kwakernaak and Sivan, 1972; Backus and Drifﬁll,
1986). For the rest of this paper we use the following deﬁnition: The economy is stabilized by a policy if all eigenvalues of
the transition matrix are inside the unit circle. If the economy is stabilized by a policy we call such a policy stabilizing. In
general, because bo1 a stabilizing commitment policy may not exist for all problems in the LQ RE class.
One way to solve the system (58)–(62) is to use the Schur decomposition, see e.g. So¨derlind (1999). Alternatively, and
more convenient for our purpose, we can also solve the system using an iterative scheme.
System (58)–(62) can be written as
0 0 Z
0 b 0
0 0 rb
2
64
3
75
ctþ1
ptþ1
xtþ1
2
64
3
75¼
0 0 k
1 n 0
0 0 nb
2
64
3
75
ut
bt
ft
2
64
3
75þ
l k 0
k 1 0
0 nb 1
2
64
3
75
ct
pt
xt
2
64
3
75, ð63Þ
utþ1
btþ1
ftþ1
2
64
3
75¼
ru 0 0
0 r 0
0 0 1
2
64
3
75
ut
bt
ft
2
64
3
75þ
0 0 0
Z 0 0
0 1 0
2
64
3
75
ct
pt
xt
2
64
3
75: ð64Þ
Substitute (31)–(33) into both sides of (63) and use (64) to substitute out utþ1, btþ1, ftþ1. We obtain
lþZ2xb kþZxf 0
bZpbk bpfþ1 0
bZrxb bðnrxfÞ 1
2
664
3
775
ct
pt
xt
2
64
3
75¼
Zxuru Zrxb kþZxf
brupuþ1 nþbrpb bpf
brxuru br2xb bðnrxfÞ
2
664
3
775
ut
bt
ft
2
64
3
75:
Substitution of (31)–(33) yields the matrix algebraic Riccati equation (34) in the main text. We can guess all feedback
coefﬁcients in (31)–(33) and thus in the right hand side of the equation above. Then, the Riccati equation (34) gives an
update of these coefﬁcients: in the next step we update the right hand side of it and iterate until convergence. The
algorithm will converge (Lancaster and Rodman, 1995).
Although the baseline calibration delivers a stabilizing solution, note that if the ﬁscal feedback is weak, 0omomn, where
mn ¼ ð1 ~UÞð1bÞk=ð ~Uðð1 ~UÞkzy ~UÞÞ, the economy is not stabilized by policy. The optimal monetary policy still delivers a
ﬁnite value of the loss function (8), but all variables exhibit slow explosion with a rate of explosion less than 1=
ﬃﬃﬃ
b
p
. However,
this solution should be disregarded as it violates the assumption of a ﬁnite working week.22
Finally, note that Eq. (59) implies price stability: if ft ¼ 0 and limt-1ft ¼ 0 it follows that
P1
t ¼ 0 pt ¼ 0.
Appendix B. Limited commitment and matrix equations
System (37)–(41) can be written as
0 0 Z
0 bð1aÞ 0
0 0 rbð1aÞ
2
64
3
75
ctþ1
ptþ1
xtþ1
2
64
3
75¼
l k 0
baZpabk 1 0
0 nbð1aÞ 1
2
64
3
75
ct
pt
xt
2
64
3
7522 This result was shown in a similar model in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) and in Kirsanova and Wren-Lewis (2012).
C. Himmels, T. Kirsanova / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 37 (2013) 649–665 663þ
0 0 k
bapauru1 bapabrn 0
baSaub baSabb bðnð1aÞþapabÞ
2
64
3
75
ut
bt
ft
2
64
3
75, ð65Þ
utþ1
btþ1
ftþ1
2
64
3
75¼
0 0 0
Z 0 0
0 1 0
2
64
3
75
ct
pt
xt
2
64
3
75þ
ru 0 0
0 r 0
0 0 1
2
64
3
75
ut
bt
ft
2
64
3
75: ð66Þ
Substitute (31)–(33) into both sides of (65) and use (66) to substitute out utþ1, btþ1, ftþ1. We obtain the matrix Eq. (45) in
the main text.
Parameters Sabb and S
a
ub are the components of the value function; to close the system we write (36) in the form
of Bellman equation and substitute (31)–(33). We obtain the matrix Eq. (46). Eqs. (45) and (46) solve the limited
commitment problem.
Appendix C. Limited commitment policy in general LQ RE framework
We assume a non-singular linear deterministic rational expectations model, augmented by a vector of control
instruments. Speciﬁcally, the evolution of the economy is explained by the linear system
ytþ1
Etxtþ1
" #
¼
A11 A12
A21 A22
" #
yt
xt
" #
þ
B1
B2
" #
utþC
xtþ1
0
 
, ð67Þ
where yt is an n1-vector of predetermined variables with initial conditions y0 given, xt is n2-vector of non-predetermined
(or jump) variables with limt-1xt ¼ 0, ut is a k-vector of policy instruments of the policy maker, and xt is a vector of i.i.d.
shocks with covariance matrix S. For notational convenience we deﬁne the n-vector zt ¼ ðy0t ,x0tÞ0 where n¼ n1þn2. We
assume A22 is non-singular.
The inter-temporal policy maker’s welfare criterion is deﬁned by the quadratic loss function
L0 ¼
1
2
E0
X1
t ¼ 0
btg0tQgt ¼
1
2
E0
X1
t ¼ 0
bstðz0tQztþ2z0tPutþu0tRutÞ: ð68Þ
The elements of vector gs are the goal variables of the policy maker, gt ¼ Cðz0t ,u0tÞ0. Matrix Q is assumed to be symmetric and
positive semi-deﬁnite.23
Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) and then Debertoli and Nunes (2010) demonstrate that the optimization problem
can be written as
min E0
X1
t ¼ 0
ðbð1aÞÞtðz0tQztþ2z0tPutþu0tRutþbay0tþ1Sytþ1Þ, ð69Þ
subject to
ytþ1 ¼ A11ytþA12xtþB1utþCxtþ1,
ð1aÞEtxtþ1þaHytþ1 ¼ A21ytþA22xtþB2ut ,
where H and S are components of the solution to the corresponding discretionary problem, xt ¼Hyt and the loss is
LtðytÞ ¼ 12 y0tSyt .
The ﬁrst order conditions to the appropriate Lagrangian
Lqc ¼
X1
t ¼ 0
ðbð1aÞÞtðz0tQztþ2z0tPutþu0tRutþbay0tþ1Sytþ1þ2j0tþ1ðA21ytþA22xtþB2utð1aÞxtþ1aHytþ1Þ
þ2c0tþ1ðA11ysþA12xsþB1usþxtþ1ysþ1ÞÞ,
can be written as
I 0 0 0 0
0 bA022 0 0 bA
0
12
0 B02 0 0 B
0
1
aH 0 0 ð1aÞI 0
0 bð1aÞA021 0 0 bð1aÞA011
2
6666664
3
7777775
ytþ1
jtþ1
utþ1
xtþ1
ctþ1
2
6666664
3
777777523 It is standard to assume that R is symmetric positive deﬁnite (see Anderson et al., 1996, for example). However, since many economic applications
involve a loss function that places no penalty on the control variables, we note that the requirement of Q being positive deﬁnite can be weakened to Q
being positive semi-deﬁnite if additional assumptions about other system matrices are met (Clements and Wimmer, 2003). The analysis in this paper is
valid for R 0.
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A11 0 B1 A12 0
bQ 012 I bP2 bQ22 0
P01 0 R P02 0
A21 0 B2 A22 0
bðð1aÞQ11þaSÞ aH0 bð1aÞP1 bð1aÞQ12 I
2
6666664
3
7777775
yt
jt
ut
xt
ct
2
6666664
3
7777775
: ð70Þ
Solution to this system (using Schur decomposition, for example, or iteration Riccati equation as we do in the text) can
be written in the form
ut
xt
ct
2
64
3
75¼
Xuy Xuj
Xxy Xxj
Xcy Xcj
2
64
3
75 ytjt
" #
,
ytþ1
jtþ1
" #
¼
Myy Myj
Mjy Mjj
" #
yt
jt
" #
,
Wtðyt ,jtÞ ¼
1
2
yt
jt
" #0
U11 U12
U21 U22
" #
yt
jt
" # !
: ð71Þ
Eq. (69) yields
U11 U12
U21 U22
" #
¼
I 0
Xxy Xxj
Xuy Xuj
2
64
3
75
0 Q11 Q12 P1
Q 012 Q22 P2
P01 P
0
2 R
2
64
3
75
I 0
Xxy Xxj
Xuy Xuj
2
64
3
75þM0 bð1aÞU11þbaS bð1aÞU12bð1aÞU21 bð1aÞU22
" #
M: ð72Þ
A possible iterative scheme is (different order of updates is possible)1. Guess M, X, U, as part of them we have H¼ Xxy, S¼U11.
2. Compute an update of U using (72). ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃp
3. Solve (70) using Schur decomposition (with stability threshold as 1= bð1aÞÞ to ﬁnd an update for X and M.Once the procedure has converged, we can ﬁnd the loss using the standard approach. Assume that the social welfare
loss is given by
LS ¼ 1
2
E0
X1
t ¼ 0
btg0tQSgt ¼
1
2
E0
X1
t ¼ 0
bst
yt
xt
ut
2
64
3
75
0 QS11 Q
S
12 P
S
1
QS012 Q
S
22 P
S
2
PS01 P
S0
2 R
S
2
664
3
775
yt
xt
ut
2
64
3
75
¼ 1
2
traceðQ^SP^ Þ,
where
Q^S ¼
I 0
Xxy Xxj
Xuy Xuj
2
64
3
75
0 QS11 Q
S
12 P
S
1
QS012 Q
S
22 P
S
2
PS01 P
S0
2 R
S
2
664
3
775
I 0
Xxy Xxj
Xuy Xuj
2
64
3
75,
P^ ¼ E0
X1
t ¼ 0
bst
yt
jt
" #0
yt
jt
" #
,
and QS is not necessarily the same as Q in (69) because the policy maker’s objectives are not necessarily social.24 Matrix P^
can be found from
vecðP^ Þ ¼ ðIbðM^  M^ÞÞ1 vec b
1bVþZ0
 
,
where
M^ ¼ ð1aÞMþa Myy 0
0 0
 
, V ¼ E0
xtþ1
0
 
xtþ1
0
 0 !
and Z0 ¼
y0
j0
" #
y0
j0
" #0
:
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